China has been developing and exporting electric vehicles at breakneck speed, but problems are now emerging—snapped brakes, failing axles, etc.—driven by skipped testing and reduced quality control. Chinese companies develop new cars in roughly half the time of Western auto companies, and limiting quality control is one reason for that speed. Chinese automakers take about 18 months to develop a new vehicle, roughly half the time established automakers need. As domestic sales have fallen by more than 20%, Chinese auto exports have increased by 65.8% (8.2 million vehicles) in the first nine months of this year, and are already higher than all of last year’s exports. Chery, for example, generates more than half of its revenue abroad and aims to build 70% of its exported vehicles in overseas factories by 2030.

The following material is condensed from the Epoch Times article, “The Fast and the Spurious: The Problem With China’s Auto Industry.”  The article provides an in-depth view into China’s rapidly growing automobile manufacturing business and offers perspective on both the promise and the problems facing the industry.

Problems are Showing Up

In October, brake pedal brackets broke on three Huawei-JAC Maextro luxury minivans in a Chinese media test, prompting a government probe and a promised redesign. In Malaysia, a Chery Omoda 5’s rear axle detached—the second such failure there, after one in April 2024. The problem was blamed on weak welds on the axle’s trailing arms. On October 10, China’s industry ministry and three other agencies issued draft rules aimed at carmakers that put insufficiently tested designs on the road. Its toughest testing requirements apply only to new models filed from 2027. Approved models that use innovative designs face a paperwork deadline of July 1, 2027. The People’s Daily endorsed the move, using the label “crash-course cars” for models with compressed development and trimmed real-world testing.

Copying Competitors

China’s auto industry is known for copying competitors’ models. Copying other companies’ products is a business model under the Chinese Communist Party and is encouraged because it lets a company reach a competitor’s level without spending money. China has a phrase for its business model: “overtaking on the curve.” In 2014, Chinese leader Xi Jinping noted that “new energy vehicles” were the “path that must be taken” for China to become a strong car country. In China, “new energy vehicles” are those that principally rely on electricity, whether battery electric, plug-in hybrid, or fuel cell.  From 2009 to 2023, China spent at least $230 billion on its auto industry, though support per sale has fallen sharply since the early years.

Chery, the state-backed automaker whose SUV lost its axle in Malaysia, for example, launched a cheap minicar in 2003, the QQ, that resembled the Daewoo Matiz, which General Motors later sold in China as the Chevrolet Spark. In 2004, GM’s South Korean unit, GM Daewoo, sued, alleging that the QQ copied the Matiz. It also claimed that Chery used a disguised Matiz to pass the government tests needed to sell the QQ. Chery denied copying, saying that it developed the car itself, and the companies settled in 2005.

Testing Less

In 2025, Maextro, a luxury brand Huawei was building with state-owned JAC Motors, launched a sedan, the S800. Its first minivan, the V800, went on sale in August 2026 starting at about $114,000. On October 8, the Chinese car review site Dongchedi released a video of three new V800 vehicles undergoing emergency stops from 62 miles per hour on a closed course. On each one, the plastic bracket holding the brake pedal snapped. The last van, bought to verify the first two results and showing about two miles on its odometer, lost its foot brake on its second full-force stop.

Chinese auto commentators reported that the V800’s brake pedal was mounted on a glass-fiber-reinforced plastic bracket. After the video, Maextro called the review site’s test an extreme, “non-standard” condition. Five days later, it cited a lab report saying that the part met China’s industry standard. A staff member at the lab said its reports cover only the samples a company submits, not mass production. Maextro called its fix a “free upgrade,” which customer service told Chinese media is “not a recall” and which owners of delivered vehicles must request. Three government agencies opened a joint investigation on October 15 and, as of early November, have not published their findings. In the United States, the situation would likely result in an immediate recall.

When something breaks, China tends to hide the evidence. The brake video could no longer be watched on several Chinese platforms the morning after it was released. A notice on WeChat said the video had been pulled for breaking the rules after a complaint. The Xinjiang region government’s official WeChat account, which criticized Maextro for answering safety questions with a list of industry standards, hid its post within hours, after it got more than 100,000 reads. Xinhua’s repost of Maextro’s statement was removed as well.

In September 2025, China’s internet censor and five other agencies launched a campaign against online “chaos” in the auto industry, saying that they were going after paid smears and fake reviews. Among the accounts the censor later penalized were ones it accused of “hyping” car accidents and of posting car tests that reached “misleading conclusions.” That same censor is now part of the V800 probe. On October 15, it joined the industry and market regulators in investigating the van.

Testing gets squeezed to hit a launch date. Chinese automakers do most of their testing on computers and leave real-world tests for the end. They also launch cars before every part is mature, counting on software updates to finish the job. While that approach can work for code, hardware like a brake bracket or a faulty door handle cannot be fixed with a software update. The People’s Daily quoted the head of Hyundai’s Chinese joint venture saying that some brands skip tests and turn customers into “test drivers,” and reported that one unnamed EV maker ran only one-fifth of its door-handle tests on real hardware, with the rest simulated.

Fast rollouts of driver-assistance systems have drawn scrutiny, too. In March 2025, three college students on their way to an exam died when their Xiaomi SU7, the phone maker’s first car, hit a concrete barrier in a highway construction zone at about 60 miles per hour and caught fire. Xiaomi said the car was in driver-assist mode, the system warned of obstacles, and the driver took over and braked but could not avoid the barrier. In September 2025, Xiaomi recalled nearly 117,000 SU7s—about 34% of those it had sold—to fix flaws in the driver-assistance system through an over-the-air software update.

Countries Limit Auto Chinese Imports

On October 6, the rear axle of an Omoda 5 detached on a road in Johor Bahru, Malaysia. After video of the incident spread, Malaysian authorities suspended the model’s type approval and new registrations until regulators confirm that the risk had been addressed. Five days later, Chery’s Malaysian unit apologized for the inconvenience and recalled 8,878 vehicles. In 2024, it had blamed the same model’s axle failure on a supplier’s improperly calibrated welding machine. On November 6, China’s market regulator announced Chery’s recall of 53,882 Omoda and Tiggo 5x vehicles in China over a similar rear-axle weld problem.

Other countries are using tariffs and trade barriers to limit Chinese auto imports. Mexico raised its tariff on cars from China and other non-treaty countries from 20% to 50% in January. In October, the European Union and China agreed to curb China’s hybrid exports, with the EU setting an annual cap of 350,000 cars—less than half what was projected for this year. The cap, however, does not include Chinese autos built in the EU.

In 2024, the United States raised its tariff on Chinese electric vehicles from 25% to 100%. A Commerce Department rule bars Chinese software from connected cars starting with the 2027 model year and prohibits sales by manufacturers with Chinese ties, even if their cars are built in America. The rule lets companies seek specific authorizations for otherwise prohibited transactions. In June, the Commerce Department denied Polestar, a brand majority-owned by China’s Geely, the authorization it needed to keep selling new cars in the United States from the 2027 model year, even though its Polestar 3 SUV is built in South Carolina. However, Volvo, also owned by Geely, received an authorization in May.

A bipartisan bill sponsored by Senators Bernie Moreno and Elissa Slotkin would put the ban on Chinese connected car technology into law and bar the import, sale, and operation of vehicles made in China. Though the measure cleared the Senate Commerce Committee unanimously in July, Senator Rand Paul blocked a fast-track vote in September.

In January, Canada agreed to let in up to 49,000 China-made electric vehicles per year at a 6.1% tariff, a cap set to rise to about 70,000 within five years. Chery, which has set up a Canadian subsidiary, plans to launch its Omoda and Jaecoo brands in Canada in early 2027.

Like the United States, Canada relies on automakers to vouch for their cars. Manufacturers certify that their vehicles meet Canadian safety standards, and companies issue recalls, not the government. The Canadian transportation agency can order a company to notify owners and fix a defect, and it can fine violators up to $200,000 per violation. The department said it is not reviewing China’s new testing rules or the V800 brake reports because no related incidents have occurred in Canada. If Chinese automakers enter the Canadian market under the new quota, they will face strict federal safety enforcement alongside established consumer expectations around long-term reliability and dealer service networks.

Conclusion

China has quickly evolved in the global auto industry, with exports rising as its domestic market sales slump. Helped by government incentives to get off the ground, Chinese auto manufacturers can develop a new auto in half the time it takes their Western counterparts, but in doing so, they have learned to copy their competitors’ models, which is encouraged by the government, and to cut corners on quality, which has problems that are showing up abroad and in tests that are hidden by the government.  China is drafting rules to address problems from spurious testing, which often occurs virtually, even for major parts.

 

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